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STATE ACTION AND STATUTORY LIENS IN
ARKANSAS - A REJOINDER TO PROFESSOR MALTZ
Steve H. Nickles*
Convention usually limits a rejoinder to a few pages. Fortun-
ately, however, a response which is brief in relation to my original
article' is all that is necessary or warranted in this case. I thank the
Journal's editors for giving me the opportunity to present it.
Possessory Liens and State Action.
The issue in Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks' is under what cir-
cumstances the action of a possessory lienor to enforce his lien may
fairly be attributed to the state so that a debtor cannot be deprived
of his property without due process of law. Professor Maltz inter-
prets the decision as holding that state action will be found under
the public function rubric when the debtor has no remedy whereby
he can challenge the lawfulness of the property's actual or threat-
ened disposition by the lienor.3 I agree with him so far, but the
problem is that he goes no further.
He interprets Flagg Brothers as holding that this is the only
instance where state action will be found under the delegated public
function doctrine,4 at least as it is applied to cases involving dis-
putes between creditors and debtors. If any remedy or "some oppor-
tunity. . ."I exists whereby the debtor can challenge the sale, "the
state, through the courts, still retains the ultimate authority to
determine whether the disposition of goods was in fact lawful.",
Maltz conbludes that by retaining such authority the state has not
delegated to the lienor a function traditionally reserved exclusively
to the state. He also concludes that the availability to the debtor of
any remedy is sufficient to establish the state's retention of this
authority. This is the precise point on which we disagree.
I argue that the efficacy of the available remedies, and not
simply their availability, is important in the search for state action
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas (Fayetteville).
1. Nickles, Creditors' Provisional Remedies and Debtors'Due Process Rights: Statutory
Liens in Arkansas, 32 ARK. L. REv. 185 (1978).
2. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
3. See Maltz, State Action and Statutory Liens in Arkansas - A Reply to Professor
Nickles, 2 UALR L. J. 357, 362 (1979).
4. See id.




in this type of case under the public function doctrine.' This idea is
not completely unknown even to Professor Maltz. He argues in an-
other not totally unrelated context that with respect to the state
action question, the quality of a thing is equally as significant as its
existence.' The essence of my reasoning is that judicial remedies
were created unequal. Some are better suited or more effective for
resolving a particular dispute or redressing a particular wrong. This
notion is foreign to no one, and the United States Supreme Court
has embraced it? The next step in my reasoning is a short one:
Having no effective remedy or "real choice," as I use that term in
my article,"0 is, for all practical purposes, like having none at all.
And Maltz and I agree that where a debtor is without any remedy
to challenge a possessory lienor's disposition of the collateral, the
creditor's action is attributable to the state."
The debtor in Flagg Brothers unquestionably had at least one
potentially effective remedy under New York law, i.e., a replevin
action against the warehouseman."2 State action was therefore lack-
ing in that case. But I argue that a property owner in Arkansas has
no efficacious remedy to challenge a sale by a vehicle repairman
asserting a lien under Arkansas Statutes Annotated title 51, chapter
4.13 This means that state action is present, and the statute is un-
constitutional unless it provides the procedural safeguards required
to afford the debtor due process of law. My conclusion that it fails
to provide them" is not disputed by Professor Maltz.
Maltz does dispute my contention" that replevin is unavailable
in Arkansas to a debtor whose property has been impounded by a
creditor asserting a vehicle repairmen's lien.8 If the debtor can sue
to replevy his property, then the situation is clearly governed by the
holding in Flagg Brothers with respect to the public function theory
7. See Nickles, supra note 1, at 243-46.
8. See Maltz, supra note 3, at 366-67.
9. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978). And see Nickles,
supra note 1, at 245. Professor Maltz is correct when he asserts that "there was no problem
[in Craftl in finding state action without resort to the sovereign function doctrine." Maltz,
supra note 3, at 362 n.36. But I did not cite the case for that position. I used it merely to
illustrate the Court's awareness that some remedies are more effective than others.
10. See Nickles, supra note 1, at 244 et seq.
11. See Maltz, supra note 3, at 362.
12. The Court in Flagg Brothers presumed that the debtor "could have sought to re-
plevy her goods at any time under state law. See N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 7101 et seq.
(McKinney 1963)." 436 U.S. at 160.
13. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-404 to -412 (Repl. 1971).
14. See Nickles, supra note 1, at 226-36.
15. See id. at 224.
16. See Maltz, supra note 3, at 359-60.
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of state action because that remedy provides an effective way to
challenge the lawfulness of a threatened sale. Maltz's argument that
replevin is available is not totally untenable, 7 but the authority he
relies upon' s is not as overtly supportive as he pretends it to be.
When the question of the constitutionality of the vehicle repair-
men's lien reaches the Arkansas Supreme Court, I hope this issue
will be clarified. Professor Maltz does not discuss, as I do in my
article, the availability of remedies other than replevin." Therefore,
I will not rehash here the question whether there are others that may
be effective. 20 If he is content to allow the state action question
under the public function rubric to hinge on the availability of re-
plevin, then so am I. But a finding of state action in this context
does not depend solely upon the invocation of the public function
doctrine.
Professor Maltz fails to discern the differences between a ware-
houseman's sale under UCC Article 7 and one under a vehicle re-
pairmen's lien law. They differ in several respects including the
extent of overt official involvement which was totally lacking in
Flagg Brothers . 2' The state is actively involved when an automobile
is sold pursuant to a repairmen's lien.22 The Court of Appeals of New
York believes this difference is substantial and significant after
Flagg Brothers. 2 3 State action may then be found without any reli-
17. See Nickles, supra note 1, at 225 n.166.
18. Smith v. Checker Cab Co., 208 Ark. 99, 184 S.W.2d 901 (1945).
19. See Nickles, supra note 1, at 244-45.
20. See id.
21. See 436 U.S. at 157.
22. A vehicle repairman has three different remedial rights under Arkansas statutory
law. See Nickles, supra note 1, at 214-17. The exercise of his right to perpetuate a lien when
he releases possession of an automobile and to enforce it in court clearly involves the state as
an active participant in the process. See id. at 235-36. But even when the lienor retains
possession and sells the vehicle himself, the state becomes actively involved. See id. at 230-
35 and 233 n.201. Cf. id. at 219 n.152 (regarding the state's involvement in effecting transfer
of the certificate of title when an Article 9 secured party sells a vehicle subject to registration).
23. In Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 1169 (1978),
the court noted:
There are, of course, substantial differences between the private sale of goods
authorized by the warehouseman's lien law and the private sale authorized by
[New York's statute authorizing a garageman to foreclose his possessory lien for
repair and storage charges] . . . . Critical to the determination in Flagg Bros. that
the private sale did not constitute State action was the "total absence of overt
official involvement." Here, that overt governmental involvement absent in Flagg
Bros. is present to some degree. In this State, title to an automobile cannot be
transferred, and thus a sale cannot be accomplished under the Lien Law, without
registration of the vehicle by the Department of Motor Vehicles and its issuance of
a certificate of title. Thus, the fact that initiation of the sale stems from a private
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ance on the delegated public function rubric which was the princi-
pal theory urged in Flagg Brothers and the only one considered by
Maltz in his analysis of possessory liens. Debtors' lawyers and the
courts will not be as content to ignore such important differences
between lien procedures and alternative theories of state action.
Non-possessory Liens and State Action.
Professor Maltz also tries to argue that the Arkansas material-
men's lien statute 4 is immune from scrutiny under the due process
clause. I have persuaded him that such a lien deprives the land-
owner of a property interest within the purview of the fourteenth
amendment. 25 I welcome his support of this proposition and thank
him for it. He argues once again, however, that the deprivation
cannot be attributed to the state under any established state action
doctrine, although admittedly "the issue is not quite as clear [as
he believes it is] in cases dealing with possessory liens. 26 His deci-
sion to hedge a little demonstrates sound judgment. Ample author-
ity and good reasons support the view that no genuine legal issue
exists on the question of state action in the context of materialmen's
liens.
Professor Maltz cannot cite a single case directly supporting his
position that state action is lacking. No court deciding a modern
constitutional challenge to a materialmen's lien statute has resolved
the case on a finding of insufficient state action. He does not mar-
shal any support for his thesis from among secondary sources. Legal
scholars and other writers routinely reach the opposite conclusion.
27
source does not detract from the necessity that the garageman invoke both the
power of the sovereign and the participation of public officials to bring about the
involuntary transfer of title. The power of the State utilized to implement the
involuntary transfer of title pursuant to the Lien Law may be sufficiently analagous
to the issuance of a writ by a court clerk in Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., Fuentes
v. Shevin and North Ga. Finishing v. Di-Chem to support a finding of overt State
involvement in the garagemen's sale.
Id. at 379 N.E.2d at 1173 n.2 (citations omitted). It was unnecessary for the court to decide
this issue, however, because of its determination that the challenged provisions of the law
violated the due process clause of the state constitution.
24. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-601 et seq. (Repl. 1971).
25. See Maltz, supra note 3, at 357.
26. Id. at 368.
27. For example, the authors of the most recently published treatise on real property
law include in their book a section devoted to the constitutionality of mechanics' liens. See
G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 12.5 (1979). They
conclude that the lack of state action is not among the reasons why modern challenges to
these procedures have sometimes failed. They have been unsuccessful
either because courts have been unwilling to find a significant deprivation of prop-
[Vol. 2:369
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Maltz chooses to ignore completely the most relevant authorities.
He even refrains from criticizing or distinguishing a single decision
among several holding that state action is present. 2 He must believe
that Flagg Brothers makes all the difference, yet he is relegated to
picking through the opinion to find a footnote here and a suggestion
there which support his so-called "proper analysis. '2" Nothing in
Flagg Brothers directly bolsters his position, and the reason is very
plain even to the casual observer. The case is clearly distinguishable
even on its face from one involving a materialmen's lien.
First, the primary contention that state action was present in
Flagg Brothers is based on the delegated public function rubric.30
But Maltz's analysis begins with the assumption that this doctrine
is inapplicable to a materialmen's lien case.3' Second, in response
to an argument based on another state action theory,32 the Court
said in Flagg Brothers that "the crux of [the debtors'] complaint
is not that the State has acted, but that it has refused to act. ,33 But
Maltz concedes that in a materialmen's lien case the focus of the
state action analysis must be on the state's affirmative role.'4 Third,
the issue in Flagg Brothers concerns the presence of state action
when the lien is enforced by a private party and not when it is
created. But Maltz admits that state action is present at the stage
of enforcing a materialmen's lien and focuses his analysis on the
creation stage. 5 Fourth, overt official involvement was totally ab-
erty or because appropriate constitutional accomodations have been found within
the statutory scheme itself. Some well reasoned recent opinions, however, have
discerned a significant deprivation of property in the imposition of mechanics'
liens. Once this threshold is crossed, state action is easily found; the remaining
question is whether adequate safeguards exist.
Id. at 748-49 (emphasis added). Even the most recent student work analyzing a materialmen's
lien statute concludes that "the taking involves state action .... The federal and state
courts which have considered the constitutional validity of mechanics' liens and which have
discussed state action have uniformly held that the process constitutes state action." Com-
ment, Are Due Process Requirements Met Under Idaho's Mechanics' and Materialmen's Lien
Statute?, 15 IDAHo L. Rxv. 115, 138-39 (1978-79).
28. See, e.g., Connolly Dev., Inc. v. Superior Court of Merced County, 17 Cal. 3d 803,
553 P.2d 637, 132 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1976); Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277
Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976); Williams & Works, Inc. v. Springfield Corp., 81 Mich. App. 355,
265 N.W.2d 328 (1978).
29. Maltz, supra note 3, at 368.
30. See 436 U.S. at 157.
31. See Maltz, supra note 3, at 364.
32. As an alternative basis for finding state action, the debtors in Flagg Brothers argued
that the creditor's "proposed action is properly attributable to the State because the State
has authorized and encourage it in enacting § 7-210." 436 U.S. at 164.
33. 436 U.S. at 166.
34. See Maltz, supra note 3, at 364.
35. See id. at 365.
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sent from the facts in Flagg Brothers. 3 Even before the enforcement
stage, this is not the case with a materialmen's lien, and Maltz
himself realizes it." Fifth, the courts frequently have concluded that
the ancestry of a creditor's remedy is material to the state action
question.3 The warehousemen's lien asserted in Flagg Brothers was
recognized at common law, 3 and UCC Article 7 merely codifies and
regulates it. The Court suggested this fact in the Flagg Brothers
opinion.40 The materialmen's lien, however, is purely a creature of
statute" designed originally not to perpetuate traditionally private
arrangements but to encourage and facilitate private construction
activity."
Maltz's analysis fails to account fully for these facile distinc-
tions between Flagg Brothers and a materialmen's lien case. More
important, however, is his utter failure to appreciate the signifi-
cance of the most basic differences between the two types of cases.
The debtor in Flagg Brothers attempted to establish state action on
the basis of the state's inaction. A landowner contesting the validity
of a materialmen's lien argues that state action should be found on
the basis of the state's involvement. The state has described the
circumstances under which and the extent to which the lien will
arise; 43 it arises by operation of law; it cannot be perpetuated with-
out a filing with the clerk of a state court 4 or suing there;45 it cannot
be filed in the usual case without notice which may be served by a
state official; 6 it becomes a cloud on record title when it is indexed
in a recording system established and maintained by state offi-
36. See 436 U.S. at 157.
37. See Maltz, supra note 3, at 366-67. And see pp. 377-78 infra.
38. Whether a remedy was recognized and permitted as part of the common law is not
the sole test for deciding the state action issue but a factor the courts have often considered.
See, e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 330, 337 (9th Cir. 1973),
the leading case on the lack of state action when a secured party asserts his right to repos-
sess collateral under UCC § 9-503. See also Parks v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1977).
There the court found no state action when a repairman retained a debtor's automobile
pursuant to Pennsylvania's garagemen's lien law. But see Nickles, supra note 1, at 217-25.
The Third Circuit believed "that the ancient origin of the challenged activity is highly
relevant." 556 F.2d at 138.
39. See 1 L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LimS §§ 967-76 (1888).
40. See 436 U.S. at 162 n.12.
41. See Nickles, supra note 1, at 191.
42. See id. at 190.
43. See ARx. STAT. ANN. § 51-601 (1971). See also Nickles, supra note 1, at 188 n.22.
44. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-613 (1971).
45. See Burks v. Sims, 230 Ark. 170, 321 S.W.2d 767 (1959). And See Nickles, supra
note 1, at 189 n.24.
46. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-608 (1971).
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cials;17 it can only be foreclosed by suing in state court to enforce
it;18 and its value to the creditor rests on the priorities the state
establishes"9 and the threat of enforcement by the state.
In spite of all this state involvement, however, Maltz argues
that only semantic clumsiness permits the conclusion "that because
action by the government ('state action') establishes the right to
deprive a person of property, then the deprivation itself must be
subject to the structures of the fourteenth amendment." 50 He cites
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. 5' as authority for the proposi-
tion that "any such argument is untenable. ' '52 The debtor argued in
Jackson that she was entitled to due process protection when utility
service to her residence was terminated. The state action claim
which Maltz refers to in this case was based on the argument that
"the State 'has specifically authorized and approved' the termina-
tion practice. '53 The Supreme Court did reject this argument, but
Professor Maltz fails to explain why it was rejected. I will. First, the
state's only connection with the termination practice was the power
company's filing with the Public Utility Commission a general tariff
which contained a provision stating the company's intention to ter-
minate service for non-payment. 54 Second, state law may not have
required the filing of a tariff provision dealing with termination
practices.5 5 Third, the state did not scrutinize or expressly approve
the practice employed in this case.56 Fourth, the state may not have
had the authority to disapprove it." Fifth, nothing suggested that
the state in any way encouraged the practice. 5 Sixth, the utility
company had the right to terminate service at common law before
the advent of state regulation." And, seventh, the utility and not
the state established or initiated the termination remedy. 0 In
essence, then, the state "has not put its weight on the side of the
proposed practice . .6.1.
47. See id. § 51-614.
48. See id. § 51-615.
49. See id. § 51-605, -607.
50. Maltz, supra note 3 at 364.
51. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
52. Maltz, supra note 3, at 364.
53. 419 U.S. at 354.
54. See id. at 355.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 354.
57. See id. at 355.
58. See id. at 357 n.17.
59. See id. at 354 n.11.
60. See id. at 357.
61. 419 U.S. at 357.
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Compare the materialmen's lien case. The state's connections
are extensive. The state not only approved the procedure but estab-
lished it to encourage construction activity in the private sector. No
group of suppliers and contractors initiated the remedy at some
annual meeting and then followed it in the absence of state disap-
proval. The state initiated it by making it generally available in the
first place and providing that in any particular case a lien will arise
by operation of law. No creditor had the right to such a remedy at
common law, and the reason it is valuable to him today is because
the state has put its weight on the side of the lien by establishing,
perpetuating and enforcing it.
The basic distinction between Jackson and a case involving a
materialmen's lien is a simple one, but it, too, is overlooked by
Professor Maltz. Jackson involved a debtor whose real complaint
was that the state had failed to act. So did Flagg Brothers. When
the debtor in the Flagg Brothers case argued state action on the
basis of a statute authorizing the lienor to sell the debtor's property,
the Supreme Court observed that her complaint was essentially that
the state had "refused to act.""2 Jackson and Flagg Brothers are
both state "inaction" cases. But a landowner whose property is
subjected to a materialmen's lien is in the position of wishing that
the state had not acted and praying that it will act no more.
The majority's opinion in Flagg Brothers rests upon the initial
assumption that "as a factual matter any person with sufficient
physical power may deprive a person of his property .... " This
was true of the power company in Jackson. Whether or not the state
authorized the utility's termination practice, the company had the
power (no pun intended) to terminate service. This was also true of
the creditor in Flagg Brothers. He already had possession of the
debtor's goods, and he had the power to sell them with or without
statutory authorization. But, as Maltz concedes, "where nonposses-
sory liens are involved, the lienholder will have no interest or control
of the property unless the interest [and presumably the control] is
created by state law." 4 A claim of state action may be based, as it
was in Jackson and Flagg Brothers, on the state's refusal to act to
prevent the happening of some activity within the power, if not the
right, of the actor. Or it may be based, as it is in the case of a
materialmen's lien, on the state's involvement in giving the actor a
right, and therefore a power, he otherwise would not have. There is
62. 436 U.S. at 166.
63. Id. at 157.
64. Maltz, supra note 3, at 364.
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a fundamental difference. The Supreme Court in other cases has
recognized its importance to the state action issue under the four-
teenth amendment. 5 But Maltz does not appreciate the difference.
He even fails to deal with the more superficial distinctions between
a case like Jackson and one involving a materialmen's lien. His
analysis is thereby rendered fatally defective.
Professor Maltz also either overlooks or fails to appreciate fully
the extent of the direct involvement of state officials under the
Arkansas materialmen's lien statute. The Court in Flagg Brothers
began its analysis of the case by noting the "total absence of overt
official involvement . "... 6 Maltz realizes that the creditor must
file an account of his claim with the circuit court clerk in order to
perpetuate a lien.67 But the professor concludes either that accept-
ing accounts for filing is not overt involvement or, more likely, that
this involvement is not sufficiently substantial to support a finding
of state action. 8 First, however, this involvement of state officials,
regardless of its degree, distinguishes a materialmen's lien case from
Flagg Brothers. Second, the only authority Maltz cites for attaching
significance to the "quality" or "degree" or "extent" of officials'
actions for the purpose of finding state action is an inference drawn
65. For example, compare Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) with Rice v. Sioux City
Mem'l Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
66. 436 U.S. at 157 (emphasis added).
67. See Maltz, supra note 3, at 366.
68. See id. at 366-67. Professor Maltz tries to minimize the clerk's role when an ac-
count is filed pursuant to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-613 (Repl. 1971). According to him, "the
statutes only require that the lien claimant file his lien with the clerk, rather than making
recordation by the clerk a prerequisite to enforcement." Maltz, supra note 3, at 367. There-
fore, he concludes, "all of the actions necessary to establish the lien claimant's rights are
taken by private parties rather than government officials." Id. But as a practical matter,
however, I know of no way to file anything with a clerk without the clerk's participation and
cooperation. The statute does not provide that the lien claimant file the account himself at
the courthouse; it requires that the filing be made with the clerk there. And this filing is
clearly a prerequisite to the enforcement of a lien. The statute could not be clearer. Filing an
account is "the duty of every person who wishes to avail himself of this act ... " ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 51-613 (Repl. 1971). And see authorities cited Nickles, supra note 1, at 193 n.54. The
only alternative is the timely filing of a suit to enforce the lien. See authorities cited id. at
189 n.24. Also, the steps of filing an account with the clerk and recording it by the clerk are
practically inseparable. An account cannot be recorded until it is filed, and filing one is a
virtually meaningless exercise unless it is recorded. And it is the clerk, not the lien claimant,
who abstracts and indexes an account. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-614 (Repl. 1971). Finally,
whether or not proper recordation is a prerequisite to lien enforcement, recordation is a duty
imposed upon the clerk by statute and thereby actively involves a state official in the lien
procedure. See id. And this involvement is critically important to the process because it
establishes the lien of record and contributes substantially to the restriction on free alienabil-
ity suffered by the landowner.
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from a footnote in Flagg Brothers." Now who is arguing that it is
the efficacy of a thing and not its mere existence which is critical
to the state action analysis?70 And, finally, long before the enforce-
ment stage state officials do more than simply accept accounts for
filing. For instance, an account cannot be filed in many cases unless
the landowner is notified.7 The notice may be served by a public
officer.72 Also, the clerk is required by law to index liens as part of a
recordation system established and maintained by state officials."
The filing and indexing creates and continues of record a cloud on
the landowner's title. A cloud on title restricts the owner's ability
to sell or encumber the property. And it is the restriction on free
alienability which is the deprivation of a signficiant property inter-
est resulting from the imposition of a materialmen's lien.7" Maltz
himself agrees with me on this last issue.75 Also, a lien can be perpet-
uated in the absence of filing only by the initiation of a suit to
enforce it. 7 Overt official involvement with a procedure clearly sup-
ports a finding of state action, 77 and state officials are directly and
extensively involved in the Arkansas materialmen's lien procedure
long before the enforcement stage.
The basis of Professor Maltz's conclusion regarding the lack of
state action in the assertion of a materialmen's lien cannot rest on
traditionally accepted reasoning about the state action question.
The courts deciding the question prior to Flagg Brothers have used
that very reasoning to find state action. Notwithstanding the persu-
asiveness of their analyses, Maltz's own analysis is defective. First,
he does not fully appreciate the importance of distinguishing be-
tween a claim of state action based on the state's failure to act and
one based on the state's active involvement. Second, he fails to
account for the full extent of overt official involvement under the
Arkansas statute. And the basis of his conclusion cannot rest di-
rectly on Flagg Brothers because that case is clearly distinguishable
from one involving a materialmen's lien.
69. See Maltz, supra note 3, at 366-67 and n.57.
70. See id. at 366-67, and see pp. 369-70 supra.
71. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-608 (Repl. 1971).
72. See id.
73. See id. And see note 68 supra.
74. See Nickles, supra note 1, at 192-97.
75. See Maltz, supra note 3, at 357.
76. Burks v. Sims, 230 Ark. 170, 321 S.W.2d 767 (1959), and see Nickles, supra note 1,
at 189 n.24.
77. See, e.g., North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell
v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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The only other possible basis for Maltz's conclusion is his per-
ception that "the Flagg Brothers Court evinced a strong generalized
hostility to the prospect of finding state action in cases dealing with
the simple creation of commercial liens. 7 1 But this is only his per-
ception based on an inference he draws from a case not involving
the question whether the imposition of any type of lien constitutes
state action and not involving a materialmen's lien statute requiring
the affirmative involvement of the state and active participation by
its officials. He apparently would have his reader believe that after
Flagg Brothers, state action can never be found when a creditor
benefits and a debtor suffers because of a statutory lien. But his
analysis fails to support this belief and nothing in Flagg Brothers
warrants it. The Court itself cautioned that its opinion should not
be interpreted "to say that dispute resolution between creditors and
debtors involves a category of human affairs that is never subject
to constitutional constraints."7 The materialmen's lien statute in
Arkansas is subject to those constraints and is unconstitutional in
failing to comply with them.
Conclusion.
Professor Maltz accuses me of imagining constitutional prob-
lems with some of Arkansas' lien statutes. I am content to let the
reader and the courts decide which of us is imagining things. He
advises his readers that "not every unfair law is unconstitutional."'I
But I have observed that over the last decade the courts have de-
clared unconstitutional statutes creating a wide array of creditors
remedies which many believe are unfair in today's world. Material-
men's and vehicle repairmen's liens have not been spared. "A word
is not.a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used.""2 And I do not
doubt, as Professor Maltz apparently does, that beneath the lan-
guage of the fourteenth amendment live the fundamental but
dynamic notions of justice and fairness.
Regardless of the ultimate resolution of the issues about which
Professor Maltz and I disagree, I am delighted to have a colleague
78. Maltz, supra note 3, at 363.
79. 436 U.S. at 162 n.12.
80. See Maltz, supra note 3, at 368.
81. Id.
82. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J., writing the majority opin-
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engage me in such a debate. I hope, as I am sure he does, that this
public airing of our views will help delineate and develop the ques-
tions which the judges will finally decide. By helping in this way we
will have contributed to the law's progression and, after all, that is
part of what legal educators are supposed to do.
